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COMMENT
THE PROBLEM OF SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY TO IMPLEMENT A TITLE III
INTERCEPT ORDER: AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF EXPRESS JUDICIAL
AUTHORIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Congress passed Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,' which
established an elaborate procedure for judicial au-
thorization of electronic surveillance for specified
crimes.2 The essential scheme of the Act is to
prohibit all interceptions of wire and oral com-
munications except as authorized by the Act itself.
Though carefully circumscribed, Title III confers
authority upon the Attorney General of the United
States or his specially designated assistant to sanc-
tion wiretaps and oral on-premise interceptions
after a finding of probable cause and approval by
a federal judge.3
The Act represents an attempt by Congress to
establish a limited system of electronic surveillance
within the guidelines of the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Berger v. New York 4 and Katz v.
United States.5 Prior to those decisions, oral com-
munications had not been afforded fourth amend-
ment protection. In enacting Title III, Congress
recognized the potential law enforcement value of
such surveillance in the fight against organized
crime.6 At the same time, however, Congress was
seriously concerned with protecting the privacy of
individual thought and expression.7 Consequently,
Title III reflects a tension between the effective
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976) [hereinafter referred
to as Title 1111.
2 18 U.S.C. § 2516(l)(a)-(g) (1976).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1976).
4 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
5 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6 See § 801 (c), 82 Stat. 211. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).7 See § 801(d), 82 Stat. 211. See also S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 119681 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112. "The need for comprehensive,
fair and effective reform setting uniform standards is
obvious. New protections for privacy must be enacted. Guidance
and supervision must be given to State and Federal law
enforcement officers. This can only be accomplished
through national legislation. This the subcommittee pro-
poses." Id. at 69, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2156 (emphasis added).
detection and prosecution of organized crime and
the right of personal privacy against arbitrary in-
trusion by law enforcement officials.8 Nonetheless,
it would appear that "although Title III authorizes
invasions of individual privacy under certain cir-
cumstances, the protection of privacy was an
overriding congressional concern."
'
Despite its comprehensive nature, Title III is
strangely silent as regards the implementation of
judicially authorized electronic surveillance t0 As a
result, the circuit courts of appeal have divided in
their interpretation of the statute regarding the
manner and method of its implementation. In
essence, the question they confronted was whether,
and to what extent, district courts were required to
explicitly authorize breaking and entering as a
means of implementing electronic eavesdropping
authorization. Whereas some circuits took the po-
sition that express authorization was unnecessary
as it was implicit in the Title III intercept order
itself," one circuit held that Title III implicitly
authorized break-ins, but only with specificjudicial
approval.' 2 In addition, one circuit held that the
8 United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 844 (3d Cir.
1976).
9 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
'0At this point it is necessary to note a distinction
between electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping.
Wiretapping refers to the interception of telephone con-
versations and usually does not require surreptitious entry
to implement. On the other hand, electronic eavesdrop-
ping refers to interception of oral communications not
transmitted by wire. Planting "bugs" usually requires
surreptitious entry into the place or places where surveil-
lance is to occur as a means of implementation. See
NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE LAWS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 43-
44 (1976). This comment will only be concerned with
electronic eavesdropping and the problems arising from
surreptitious entry.
"See United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir.
1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979); United States v.
Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
903 (1978).
12 Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1977).
TITLE III INTERCEPT ORDERS
fourth amendment required separate consideration
of covert entry to plant a "bugging" device in the
warrant procedure. 13 Two other circuits held that
neither Title III, nor any other federal statute,
empowered district courts to authorize break-ins.'
Finally, on April 18, 1979, the issue was settled
by the United States Supreme Court in Dalia v.
United States.15 Deciding three separate questions,
the Court first ruled unanimously that the fourth
amendment ban on unreasonable search and sei-
zure is not an absolute prohibition against covert
entry under any circumstances. Next, by a six-to-
three vote, it held that although Title III does not
explicitly authorize breaking and entering, it gives
the courts the inherent power to do so. Lastly,
dividing five to four, the Court held that the fourth
amendment does not require that a Title III inter-
cept order include a specific authorization to cov-
ertly enter the premises described in the order. In
other words, the Court took the position that break-
ing and entering to install the surveillance device
was implicitly countenanced by the intercept order.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the
Dalia decision in terms of general fourth amend-
ment requirements. In particular, in examining the
constitutional, judicial, and statutory bases for the
Court's decision, the focus will be upon the histor-
ical antecedents to the enactment of the fourth
amendment. Furthermore, the interface between
the fourth amendment and electronic surveillance
in general will be considered.
Despite the Dalia decision, requiring a judicial
officer to expressly evaluate the necessity for covert
entry seems to be consistent with the basic fourth
amendment emphasis upon placing a neutral and
detached magistrate between law enforcement of-
ficials and the public. Moreover, such supervision
would best ensure minimal intrusion upon pro-
tected fourth amendment interests. This is of con-
siderable importance because such entry implicates
serious constitutional interests distinct from that of
protecting the privacy of one's oral communica-
tions. These additional interests include recogni-
tion of one's sense of personal security as well as
the prevention of the possibility of physical destruc-
tion of one's property resulting from a forcible
entry. Furthermore, the existence of the "plain
view" doctrine weighs heavily toward the policy of
specific judicial approval of break-ins. This doc-
13 United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"4 United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir.
1978).is99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
trine suggests that "objects falling in the plain view
of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be introduced in evidence."'
6
Ultimately, this comment will conclude that the
Supreme Court should not have read Title III to
countenance surreptitious entry absent express ju-
dicial authorization. In addition, this comment will
suggest that the Court gave short shrift to the
feasibility of alternative methods of intercepting
on-premise oral communications.17 Such a consid-
eration would reflect the statute's general emphasis
upon the minimization of the intrusion and would
appear to be consistent, in particular, with the
requirement that normal investigative procedures
have failed or appear likely to fail before an inter-
cept order may be granted initially.'
8
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The fourth amendment' 9 of the United States
Constitution protects the right of people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It provides that
a search will be reasonable only where there is
probable cause to search.2° Generally, "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." 21 The central concern of
this amendment is to protect an individual's liberty
and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive inter-
ference by government officials.22 Consequently, a
judicial officer must balance the need for a search
against the right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property implicated by such
an invasion.
23
In examining the applicability of the fourth
6 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
'7 See text accompanying notes 205-07 infra. See also A.
WESTIN, PRIVAcY AND FREEDOM 73-78 (1967).
'
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), (3)(c)(1976).
'
9 The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
:' Id See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See
also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,464 (1932).
22 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949);
United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 153 n.30 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
23 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 314-15 (1972).
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amendment to the issue of whether breaking and
entering must receive expressjudicial approval, the
"proscription of 'unreasonable searches and sei-
zures' must be read in light of 'the history that
gave rise to the words'-a history of 'abuses so
deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the
potent causes of the Revolution."' ' This history
shows that the basic purpose of the amendment
was to put an end to the general warrants2 and
writs of assistance under which officers of the
Crown had been empowered to conduct general
searches and seizures.2 "Since no showing of'prob-
able cause' before a magistrate was required,,
27
these writs were issued by executive rather than
judicial officers. 28 Pursuant to such writs, customs
officials and other agents of the King were granted
authority to invade the homes and privacy of
citizens in their search for smuggled goods.' More-
over, agents were permitted to seize personal papers
to support "charges, real or imaginary, made
against them. 3° At the time, James Otis de-
nounced such writs as "'the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English
liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that
ever was found in an English law book;' since they




To a large extent, the abuses inherent in the
general writ system must necessarily have influ-
enced the framing of the fourth amendment.'
Perhaps the perspective of the Framers was even
more influenced by the position taken by Lord
Camden in the famous case of Entick v. Carrington.'
In declaring the general warrant for the seizure of
papers contrary to the common law, Lord Camden
paid particular attention to the "unrestricted dis-
cretion" exercised by those who executed the war-
rants.34 He stated:
24 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1968) (cit-
ing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., with whom Jackson, J., joined, dissent-
inff).
'W'Under the general warrant, "the name of the person
to be arrested was left blank." Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
2 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1968);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-91 (1913);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886).
2' Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
2' See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 8 (1977).
29id.
30 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 390.
3' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 623.
32 Id. at 627.
33 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
' United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
This power so assumed by the secretary of state is an
execution upon all the party's papers, in the first
instance. His house is rifled; his most valuable secrets
are taken out of his possession, before the paper for
which he is charged is found to be criminal by any
competent jurisdiction, and before he is convicted
either of writing, publishing, or being concerned in
the paper.35
To correct the abuses of such indiscriminate
authority, the scheme of the fourth amendment
provides the general safeguard of reasonableness as
well as the more particular requirement of the
warrant clause.3 6 By its terms, all searches and
seizures, even if authorized by a warrant, must be
reasonable. At the least, there also must be some
showing of probable cause. In addition to provid-
ing the detailed scrutiny of a neutral magistrate,
"a warrant assures the individual whose property
is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the
executing officer, his need to search, and the limits
of his power to search. 3 7 Consequently, with the
exception of a few, narrowly drawn situations, one's
person, home, papers, and effects may not be
searched without a warrant. 3
In terms of the relevance of the fourth amend-
35 474 F.2d at 43 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
St. Tr. at 1064).
' See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
"Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the
police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires
of the police before they violate the privacy of the home."
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 456.
"When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by ajudicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent."Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 14.
37 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 9 (1977).
3 Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement
are the following:
An automobile may be searched without a warrant to
prevent the movement of contraband out of the locality
when there is insufficient opportunity to obtain a warrant
and probable cause exists. E.g., Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). A police officer may search a person
without a warrant as an incident to an otherwise lawful
arrest as a means of preventing the possible destruction
of evidence, protecting himself, and preventing escape
from custody. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
Following an arrest, an officer may also search the place
in which the arrest was made and seize things used to
carry on the criminal activity, which are in the immediate
possession and control of the accused. Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). In addition, even absent
probable cause to arrest, an officer may "frisk" a person
he has properly detained for questioning if he believes
that the person may be armed and dangerous. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ment to the issue of breaking and entering to
implement a Title III intercept order, it is signifi-
cant to recognize the amendment's respect for the
sanctity and privacy of the home. Essentially, the
fourth amendment adopted the principle "that a
man's house [is] his castle. .. ."3 Recently, this core
protection against physical entry of private
premises has been extended to protect private com-
munications.' ° To the extent that Title III fails to
address the question of implementation and thus,
according to the United States Supreme Court, is
seen as implicitly countenancing breaking and en-
tering, the historical significance of the fourth
amendment is undermined. The failure of a de-
tached magistrate to evaluate the need for such
entry, followed by covert entry at the discretion of
law enforcement personnel, may be seen as analo-
gous to a return to the discredited, unrestrained
general warrant system. The experience of history
demonstrates that "power is a heady thing; and
... that the police acting on their own cannot be
trusted." '41 Thus, prior to the Dalia decision, it
would have seemed that any invasion of the other-
wise inviolability of the home, as distinguished
from the privacy of oral communications within
the home, must be expressly authorized by a judi-
cial officer to vindicate the protections of the fourth
amendment.42 That the Court chose to discount
the significance of this separate interest is at the
very least surprising in light of the potential for
significant abuse.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE LAW
In Olmstead v. United States,43 the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with its first case
involving electronic surveillance. Facing the ques-
tion of whether the interception of private tele-
39 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1913).
Earlier, James Otis had stated: "Now one of the most
essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of
one's house. A man's house is his castle; and whilst he is
quiet he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle." Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 51-52 (1963).
"Set text accompaning notes 54-70 infra.
4' McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 456.
Such authorization would be satisfied by express
approv&l for surreptitious entry in the intercept order
itself. The point is that a neutral and detached magistrate
has considered the necessity for the entry as well as the
serious interests involved in permitting such. It should be
recognized that the circumstances underlying the issu-
ance of an intercept order are analogous to the issuance
of a traditional search warrant. Both the intercept order
and the search warrant serve to sanction intrusions other-
wise constitutionally prohibited.
43 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
phone conversations by means of wiretapping vio-
lated the fourth amendment, the Court held that
since Olmstead's telephone line was intercepted
without entry upon his premises, the wiretap did
not violate the fourth amendment. Chief Justice
Taft, speaking for the majority, reasoned that com-
munications over a telephone line did not come
within the fourth amendment's protections of "per-
sons, houses, papers and effects." The ChiefJustice
also stated: "The Amendment does not forbid what
was done here.... There was no seizure. The evi-
dence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only. There was no entry of the houses or
office of the defendants." Justices Holmes, Bran-
deis, Stone, and Butler dissented strongly.4 The
majority's position has subsequently become
known as the "trespass doctrine."
Responding to Olmstead, Congress enacted the
Federal Communications Act of 1934,46 the first
federal statute dealing with electronic surveillance.
Section 605 stated that "[n]o person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio
communication and divulge or publish the exis-
tence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or mean-
ing of such intercepted communication to any
person." '4 In Nardone v. United States" the Court
interpreted "any person" as used in the statute to
include federal officers, thereby extending the pro-
hibition against wiretapping to them.49 In the sec-
ond Nardone case,so the Court applied the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine 1 and ruled that the
"Id. at 464.
4 The progress of science in furnishing the Govern-
ment with means of espionage is not likely to stop
with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be devel-
oped by which the Government, without removing
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to
ajury the most intimate occurrences of the home....
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security?
To protect [the right to be let alone] every unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the Government upon the pri-
vacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 474, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4647 U.S.C. §605 (1976).
4 id.
4302 U.S. 379 (1937).
"' The Court stated: "Congress may have thought it
less important that some offenders should go unwhipped
of justice than that officers should resort to methods
deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destruc-
tive of personal liberty." Id at 383.
50 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
s' See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).
government might not make use of information
obtained by means of an illegal wiretap.
In Goldman v. United States,52 the Court held that
the action of federal agents in placing a detecta-
phone"3 on the outer wall of the defendant's hotel
room, and thereby overhearing conversations held
within the room, did not violate the fourth amend-
ment. Although the agents had earlier committed
a trespass to install a listening device within the
room itself, the "bug" failed to work. Consequently,
the Court expressly reserved a decision as to the
fourth amendment overtones of such a trespass.
Since the intrusion of a detectaphone was not
trespassory, the Court applied the Olmstead ration-
ale and found that electronic surveillance, con-
ducted without a physical trespass, was outside the
protection of the fourth amendment.
In Silverman v. United States, the "trespass doc-
trine" was taken to its logical conclusion. There,
police officers had inserted a microphone with a
foot long spike attached to it into the wall of the
-'efendant's house. The "spike-mike" made contact
with the home's heating duct and thus converted
it into a huge microphone running throughout the
entire house. The Court found that such action
constituted a trespass and was a violation of the
fourth amendment.
At the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion.... This Court has never held that a federal
officer may without warrant without consent physi-
cally entrench into a man's office or home, there
secretly observe or listen, and relate ... what was
seen or heard.... [The] decision here does not turn
upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall
as a matter of local law. It is based upon ti- reality
of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area.ss
Once again, the Court distinguished between the
trespass and the surveillance. Expressly refusing to
reexamine the rationale of Olmstead and Goldman,
the Court indicated that the surveillance itself was
not violative of the fourth amendment. Rather, the
emphasis was upon the right to be secure in one's
home against unauthorized physical intrusion.
Substantial inroads into the application of the
"trespass doctrine" to electronic surveillance began
52316 U.S. 129 (1942).
'This device was placed against an office wall in
order to hear conversations in the office next door.
s4 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
5 Id. at 511-12 (citations omitted).
in 1966 with Berger v. New York. 56 There, the Court
considered the validity of New York's statutory
authorization scheme for electronic surveillance.
57
Carefully analyzing the statute's provisions, the
Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face
because it permitted the seizure of conversations
without sufficiently narrow warrant procedures.
Although it interposed a neutral and detached
magistrate between the police and the public, the
statute was found void because electronic surveil-
lance authorization could be obtained without the
particularity 8 and limited scope 9 constitutionally
required for search warrants. These requirements
are essential "to prevent unauthorized invasions of
'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life." ' 6° However, although the Court was unwill-
ing to go so far as to find electronic surveillance
per se unconstitutional, it did set forth in great
detail specific standards that any constitutional
electronic surveillance statute would have to
meet.
6 1
" 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
S N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. LAW § 813-a (McKinney
1958). On the basis of a complaint alleging the demand
of a $10,000 payment of a bribe for a liquor license, as
well as recorded evidence obtained under the direction of
the attorney general, a New York judge, pursuant to the
New York statute, issued an order permitting the instal-
lation of a recording device in an attorney's office for a
period of 60 days. Later, another eavesdrop order was
issued for another individual's office. After a two-week
period of eavesdropping, law enforcement officials ob-
tained evidence linking the defendant to a bribery con-
spiracy. Despite defendant's objections, the trial court
admitted relevant portions of the recordings.
5 The Fourth Amendment commands that a war-
rant issue not only upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, but also "particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." New York's statute lacks this
particularization. It merely says that a warrant may
issue on reasonable ground to believe that evidence
of crime may be obtained by the eavesdrop. It lays
down no requirement for particularity in the war-
rant as to what specific crime has been or is being
committed, nor "the place to be searched," or "the
persons or things to be seized" as specifically re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment.
388 U.S. at 55-56.
s9 Id. at 59-60.
r'Id. at 58 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)).
" These standards include:
I. A showing of facts sufficient to establish probable
cause to believe that a particular offense has been
or is being committed.
2. A description of the particular conversations or
communications to be intercepted.
3. A limitation on the duration of the intrusion. The
Court emphasized that the intrusion shall not be so
COMMENT [Vol. 70
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Implicit in the Berger decision was the notion
that the fourth amendment's protection applied
not only to physical trespass but also to covert
interception of conversations. By holding that the
New York statute was to be considered on its face
rather than as applied, the Court seemed to over-
rule the Olmstead rationale sub silentio.62 Thus, a
warrant issued pursuant to the statute, as then in
effect, never could have satisfied the requirements
of the fourth amendment. 6a
The process of burying the Olnstead "trespass
doctrine," begun in Berger, was concluded in the
leading case of Katz v. United States,' in which the
Court held that "the fourth amendment protects
people, not places. ' ' ss In Katz, evidence obtained
by a warrantless, nontrespassory "bug" placed on
the outside wall of a public telephone booth was
held inadmissible as evidence. Essentially, the
Court reversed its longstanding position and de-
cided that a trespass was not a condition precedent
to a violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights in actions involving electronic surveillance.
Regardless of whether a public telephone booth
could be characterized as a constitutionally pro-
tected area, an individual speaking to someone
over the telephone has a "reasonable expectation
of privacy" with respect to the contents of those
conversations. 66 The Court declared that "[w]hat
long as to be "the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing
of probable cause."
4. Extensions may only be granted upon a snuw.,,g
both that the extension is in the public interest and
that there is present probable cause for the contin-
uation of the eavesdrop.
5. A requirement that the electronic surveillance be
terminated once the conversation sought is seized,
even though it be prior to the expiration date of the
order.
6. A requirement of either notice to the person
whose conversations were to be intercepted or a
showing of special facts or exigent circumstances
necessitating the withholding of notice.
Id. at 58-60.
'2 At least Justice Douglas expressly took this position,
joining the Court's opinion "because at long last it over-
rules sub silentio Olmstead v. United States .... Id. at 64
(Douglas, J., concurring).
SBy its terms, the statute seemed to permit general
searches, which had been forbidden by the adoption of
the fourth amendment.
r4389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6"Id. at 351.
6 A person possesses a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy if that person exhibits an actual, subjective expec-
tation of privacy and more importantly, the expectation
is one society is generally willing to recognize as reason-
able. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected."
67
As in Berger, the Katz Court did not suggest that
electronic surveillance never could pass constitu-
ional muster. Rather, the Court merely recognized
that electronic eavesdropping is a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment and cannot be
conducted in the absence of carefully circum-
scribed procedures-particularly, an "antecedent
justification" before a neutral magistrate "that is
central to the Fourth Amendment. ' 68 Finally, al-
though the Katz decision "refused to lock the
Fourth Amendment into instances of actual phys-
ical trespass,' 69 it was not intended to undermine
the protection afforded against such intrusions.'0
IV. TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL
AND SAFE STRF.ETS AcT OF 1968
A. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In response to Berger and Katz, Congress enacted
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.71 The statute purports to over-
come the constitutional problems of eavesdropping
and electronic surveillance by incorporating the
procedures and standards outlined in the two de-
cisions. Basically, Title III assimilates the strict
requirements applicable to search and seizure of
tangible physical objects to the area of electronic
surveillance. At the threshold, the statute forbids
nonconsensual7 interception of wire or oral corn-
' 389 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
68 Id. at 359.
69 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
at 313.
'o According to the court in United States v. Ford, 553
F.2d 146, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1970), "'Berger certainly did not
reject the then established premise that surreptitious
entry for the purpose of installing electronic surveillance
devices was within the ambit of the Fourth Amend-
ment .... Rather, the Court extended particularity pro-
tections formerly applicable only to the trespass to the
overhearing...." (citations omitted).
71 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). For Congressional
background, see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
66, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEws 2112.
Part of Title III, § 2518(8) (d), was declared constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
7 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (1976). By allowing elec-
tronic surveillance with consent of one party, the statute
undermines its own attempt to limit the offenses for
which surveillance devices can be employed. Moreover,
the entire system of antecedent justification before a
neutral and detached magistrate is circumvented.
munications by federal law enforcement officers
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except by court order.74 An order may be issued
only for the investigation of specified crimes 75 upon
a sworn application by the attorney general or a
specially designated assistant attorney general.7 6
Moreover, the application must contain a "full and
complete statement of the facts relied upon by the
applicant to justify his belief that an order should
be issued.",77 It should include details of the partic-
ular offense suspected, a particular description of
the facilities from which communications are to be
intercepted, a particular description of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, and the
identity of the person or persons suspected.
Importantly, the application must contain a
complete statement as to why normal investigative
procedures are not being used.7 8 Sections 2518(1) (c)
and 2518(3)(c) require that these normal investi-
gative techniques be employed unless they have
already been tried and have failed or else "reason-
ably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to
be too dangerous."79 These sections are designed to
insure that electronic surveillance is "not to be
routinely employed as the initial step in a criminal
investigation" s and "to insure that wiretapping
[or eavesdropping] is not resorted to in situations
where traditional investigative techniques would
suffice to expose the crime." 8' This is consistent
with the statute's overall emphasis upon particu-
larization and minimizations8 of the intrusiveness
engendered by the employment of electronic sur-
veillance techniques.
Upon receiving the application, the judge then
must determine that there is probable cause to
believe that the named individual is committing or
is about to commit one of the crimes enumerated
in the statute, that particular communications con-
cerning this offense will be obtained by the inter-
ception, and that the facilities or premises named
will be used by the suspected individual83 If the
judge approves the order, he must specify the
persons, if known, and places subject to the order,
the type of communications to be intercepted and
" 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976).
74 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2518 (1976) set forth the proce-
dure for acquiring judicial authorization.
75 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)-(g) (1976).
76 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(1976).
77 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1976).
78 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I)(c) (1976).
79 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e), (3)(c) (1976).
' United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).
' United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12
1974).
s, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
8318 U.S.C. 8§2518(3)(a)-(d) (1976).
the offense to which it relates, the identity of the
applicant, the person authorizing it, the agency
authorized to execute it, and the period for which
it is effective.'s The order must terminate the sur-
veillance when the objective is attained and may
extend in no event longer than thirty days.85 How-
ever, provision is made for extensions by subse-
quent application and court order.
The statute also establishes elaborate record-
keeping and reporting procedures, and requires
that within ninety days after the termination of a
court-ordered interception, the persons named in
the order, and such other persons overheard as the
judge designates "in the interest ofjustice,"as shall
be informed of the order and interception 87-unless
the judge, for "good cause," decides to postpone
such notice 89 Finally, the statute imposes certain
limitations and conditions on the uses of evidence
obtained through interception of wire or oral com-
munications.89
In light of the substantial degree of specificity of
Title III, it is most significant to note its failure to
address the problem of implementation. Neither
the provisions of Title III nor the congressional
debates contain express authority for breaking and
entering to install listening devices.90 Nonetheless,
those advocating the position that Title III author-
izes surreptitious entry have attempted to support
their position by relying upon both specific statu-
tory language and legislative history. As mentioned
above, the statute does require that the application
for an intercept order describe "the facilities from
which or the place where the communication is to
be intercepted."9' However, this hardly can be
interpreted as express authority permitting surrep-
titious entry. At best it fulfills the fourth amend-
ment requirement of particularity necessary to en-
sure the minimization of the intrusion. At the least,
it serves as a safeguard against abuse due to the
exercise of unsupervised discretion by police offi-
cers. Moreover, this language might be considered
to be directed to situations such as that which arose
in Katz involving public places rather than unau-
thorized physical entry.
s 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a)-(e) (1976).
a 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). For a discussion of this
provision, see United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 496
(3d Cir. 1973).
86 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
8 id.
88 Id.
89 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976).
90 United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 461-62 (9th
Cir. 1978).
9, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (1976).
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The Senate Report on Title III does include the
following language: "A wiretapping can take up to
several days or longer to install. Other forms or
devices may take even longer.' 92 Again this lan-
guage can hardly be deemed determinative. Al-
though the statement is ambiguous, it appears to
refer to the duration and not the method of instal-
lation. Thus, it could be acknowledging the envi-
sioned "difficulty in gaining consensual entry to
premises that the Government wanted to bug. The
mechanics of installing a bugging device can be
performed quickly; the difficulty encountered [is]
in gaining entry by legal means.
' 'ss
An additional argument that Congress intended
Title III to authorize surreptitious entry to install
"bugs" is based upon the language of 18 U.S.C. §
2518(4), which provides in part:
An order authorizing the interception of a wire or
oral communication shall, upon request ofapplicant,
direct that a communication common carrier, land-
lord, custodian or other person shall furnish the
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and
technical assistance necessary to accomplish the in-
tercepting unobtrusively and with a minimum of inter-
ference with such services that such carriers, land-
lord, custodian, or person is according the person
whose communications are to be interceptedY.
4
This language is inconclusive. Since the effec-
tiveness of an intercept depends upon the ability
to keep the fact of surveillance secret, the use of
"unobtrusively" may merely reflect the reality of
the situation. It cannot be read by itself to condone
forcible breaking and entering. Furthermore, there
is some indication that this language, which was
part of a 1970 amendment, was a direct Congres-
sional reaction to the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Application of United
States,'5 in which the court held that Title III did
not authorize ordering a local telephone company
to provide facilities, services, and technical assist-
ance for a wiretap. Nonetheless, although the case
dealt specifically with wiretapping that does not
involve surreptitious entry, as enacted, the statu-
tory amendment makes no distinction between the
two forms of electronic surveillance.
In summary, it seems clear that neither the
provisions of Title III nor its legislative history
contain any express authorization for surreptitious
92 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 103
(1968).
93 United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 461.
9' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976).
9 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970).
entry as a means of implementing a Title III
intercept order.
B. INTERPRETATION OF TITLE III
1. The Split among the Circuits
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Dalia v. United States,a9 the circuit courts of
appeal had been sharply divided on the question
of whether surreptitious entry of a home for the
purpose of installing, maintaining, or removing
electronic surveillance devices, absent valid consent
or express prior judicial approval, was a violation
of the fourth amendment. Some circuits took the
position that express authorization was unneces-
sary as it was implicit in the Title III intercept
order itself. While one circuit held that Title III
implicitly authorized break-ins but only with spe-
cific judicial approval, another decided that the
fourth amendment required separate consideration
of covert entry to plant a "bugging" device in the
warrant procedure. Finally, two circuits held that
neither Title III, nor any other federal statute,
empowered district courts to authorize break-ins.
The Second 97 and Third Circuits took the im-
plicit authorization approach. The issue arose in
the Second Circuit in United States v. Scafldi!9 in
which the defendants were convicted of illegally
operating gambling businesses.'0 Three court or-
ders had been issued authorizing the use of eaves-
dropping devices at an apartment. An additional
three court orders had authorized interceptions at
a local night spot. In the course of the investigation
several covert entries were made to install the
devices, to change their location, and to replace
their batteries. Although the warrant lacked spe-
cific authorization for breaking and entering, the
Second Circuit was willing to imply such authority
from the intercept order itself. The court held that
"when an order has been made upon adequate
proof as to probable cause for the installation of a
device in particular premises, a separate order au-
thorizing entry for installation purposes is not re-
96 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
97 United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903, (1978).
98 United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
99 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
903, (1978).
lo This count was later dismissed and was "relevant
on appeal only to the extent that the evidence presented
for [the] Count might have 'spilled over' to affect other
counts." Id at 637.
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quired."'O' The court suggested that any other
position would be "naive.",10 2 Furthermore, it noted
that judicial supervision over the method or imple-
mentation of an intercept order would be imprac-
tical. "It would be most unseemly for the courts to
invade the province of law enforcement agencies
by assuming that their competence was greater
than that of the agencies presumably skilled in
their field." t 3
Unfortunately, this argument proves too much.
The fourth amendment does not require that
judges be specialists before authorizing warrants
for particular types of searches and seizures. How-
ever, a neutral and detached magistrate must be
interposed between the public and the government
as a means of deterring abuses of police discre-
tion.' 4
In United States v. Dalia,'10 the defendant was
convicted of conspiring to transport, receive, and
possess stolen goods and of receiving stolen goods
while in interstate commerce. Following an initial
intercept order limited only to wire communica-
tions, a second order was issued authorizing the
interception of both wire and oral communications.
Later extended, these orders did not expressly au-
thorize surreptitious entry as a means of installing
the necessary equipment. However, such entry was
made onto the defendant's business premises.
Without any independent analysis, the Third Cir-
cuit embraced the Scafidi rationale, finding that an
order authorizing the interception of oral commu-
nications implicitly authorizes surreptitious entry.
However, the court did suggest that
the more prudent or preferable approach for govern-
ment agents would be to include a statement regard-
ing the need of a surreptitious entry in a request for
the interception of oral communications when a
break-in is contemplated. This burden is minimal in
light of the fourth amendment considerations that
could be later raised.1' 6
Adopting a somewhat different approach, in
Application of United States,'07 the Fourth Circuit
held that government agents could covertly enter
private premises to plant eavesdropping devices,
1D" Id. at 640.
I02 id.
103 Id.
'04 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
449 (1971) (plurality opinion).
'o- 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 1682
(1979). The Supreme Court disposition of this case is
discussed in text accompanying notes 149-207 infra.
'06 575 F.2d. at 1346-47.
'0 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977).
but an express entry provision would have to be
included in the intercept order. In this case, the
FBI had concluded that the successful investigation
of a suspected gambling operation required the use
of electronic surveillance. The district court re-
jected the government's application which sought
both authorization to intercept oral communica-
tions and express authority for one or more surrep-
titious entries.'08 On appeal, this decision was re-
versed. Focusing on Title III's legislative history
and, in particular, finding statutory concern about
the control of organized crime to be "paramount,"
the court stated:
[T]he fact that Title III does not expressly limit the
manner of installing listening devices is, in light of
the announced legislative intent, consistent with the
conclusion that Congress implicitly commended the
question of surreptitious entry to the informed dis-
cretion of the district judge, subject to the commands
of the Constitution.1 9
Importantly, the court noted the fact that, under
Katz, there are two constitutionally protected pri-
vacy interests involved in a covert entry upon
private premises. On the one hand, there is the
privacy interest in the actual communications. On
the other hand, there is the interest in the privacy
of the premises. Moreover, "when agents of the
Government physically enter business premises, as
to which an individual has a legitimate expectation
of privacy ... more than just his conversation is
subjected to the government's scrutiny. Intruding
officers are capable of seeing and touching items
which would not be disclosed by the nontrespassory
surveillance."11
0
The approach taken by this court appears more
sensible than that of the Second and Third Cir-
cuits. At the least, it is more consistent with the
history of the fourth amendment and its typical
requirements. Obviously, by its own terms, the
fourth amendment is not absolute. It forbids only
unreasonable searches and seizures. The safeguard
against unreasonableness historically has been in-
terposing judicial supervision of the scope of intru-
sions. The decision in Application of United States
attempted to establish a means of balancing the
different interests at stake in a covert entry to plant
"bugs": individual privacy and security found in
the sanctity of one's home and the requirements of
efficient law enforcement. In requir;ng express ju-
'0 d. at 639.
'09 Id. at 643.
'10 Id. at 643 n.6 (citations omitted).
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dicial authorization for surreptitious entry, this
circuit was attempting to ensure that the intrusion
into constitutionally protected rights was no
greater than minimally necessary.
In United States v. Agrusa,"'while refusing to find
implicit authorization for breaking and entering in
the language of Title III, the Eighth Circuit held
a surreptitious entry into unoccupied business
premises, effected under an express court order, to
be constitutionally permissible. 2 The surveillance
order authorized both the interception of oral and
wire communications and the covert entry neces-
sary to install and subsequently remove them. De-
termining that any announcement prior to entry
would have been self-defeating in that it would
have resulted in the avoidance of any incriminating
conversations, the court also relied upon language
in the Katz decision for guidance.
In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the
federal court that authorized electronic surveillance
... simply recognized, as has this Court, that officers
need not announce their purpose before conducting an other-
wise authorized search if such an announcement would
provoke the escape of the suspect, or the destruction
of critical evidence."
3
The court found no constitutional infirmity in
the forcible entry.
The court then proceeded to a comprehensive
examination of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the only federal
statute addressing forcible entry."4 Concluding
that noncompliance with this knock and announce-
ment statute was justified by "exigent circum-
stances," the court held that "law enforcement
officials may, pursuant to express court authoriza-
tion to do so, forcibly and without knock or an-
nouncement break and enter business premises
"' 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976) (opinion by divided
court), rehearing en banc denied (over a four-judge dissent),
541 F.2d 704 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
"2 It should be noted that the court did "not decide
what result obtains if the officers act without express
court authorization to break and enter (although with
court authorization to intercept)." Id. at 696 n.13.
3Id. at 698 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 355 n.16 (1967))(citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
""The officer may break open any outer or inner-
door or window of a house, or any part of a house,
or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if,
after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of
the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976); see text accompanying notes
169-88 infra.
which are vacant at time of entry in order to install
an electronic surveillance device.""' 5 According to
the Agrusa court, "exigent circumstances" were
present because any announcement prior to entry
would result in the ceasing of potentially incrimi-
nating conversations-a situation analogous to the
destruction of evidence."
6
In a strong dissent, Judge Lay was unconvinced
that "the effective enforcement of our criminal
laws requires government agents to break and enter
private premises, like common burglars, to plant
eavesdropping devices."" 7 Moreover, he concluded
that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent
as to vindicate the substantial intrusion that sur-
reptitious entry entails. 18 "When interception is
authorized, the means to invade zones of privacy
must be no greater than necessary."" 9 Conse-
quently, in light of the existence of such alternative
means of accomplishing the same result as the use
of confidential informants and placing wiretaps on
defendant's telephones, Judge Lay was unwilling
to countenance the use of surreptitious entry
here.'20 His dissent further argued that even in the
absence of any alternative methods of surveillance,
forcible entry to install listening devices is unrea-
sonable per se. Law enforcement interests do "not
outweigh the citizen's justifiable expectations that
government officials will not, under the cloak of
authority, surreptitiously break into his home or
office.'' Judge Lay further "hope[d] there still
exists 'a private enclave where [a person] may lead
a private life' without fear of stealthy encroach-
ment by government officials.
' ' lss
Though the Agrusa court refused to accept the
argument that Title III implicitly authorizes break-
ins, the majority focus was upon the legality of
such entry in the context of electronic surveillance.
In other words, the court assumed that express
judicial authorization was required and then pro-
ceeded to examine whether such entry to plant a
"bug" violated federal statutory law or the Consti-
tution. In light of the substantial invasion of pri-
vacy and threat to security involved in breaking
and entering, the court's position was that the
fourth amendment required express court author-
"' 541 F.2d at 701.6 Id. at 700-01.
"1 Id. at 702 (Lay, J., dissenting).
"
8 Id. at 703.
"
9 Id. at 702.
l2 id
"' Ia at 703.
' Id. (footnote omitted).
ization.23 This position seems well supported by
the history and purpose of the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Ford,13 the District ofColumbia
Circuit also rejected interpreting Title III as im-
plicitly authorizing breaking and entering.'25 As in
Agrusa, the court felt that where covert entry to
plant eavesdrop equipment is involved, a "bifur-
cated analysis" is required "in which each aspect-
trespass and overhearing-is subjected to an inde-
pendent Fourth Amendment analysis."'6 In this
case, after conventional surveillance techniques
had been unsuccessful, the Washington Metropol-
itan Police sought a court order authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance of a store suspected of being the
center of narcotic activity. The intercept order
included a provision authorizing police "to enter
and re-enter... in any manner."' 27 No limitations
were placed on the manner of entry or on the
number of entries permitted.
In an opinion by Judge Skelly Wright, the court
held that the fourth amendment required valid
consent or "sufficiently particularized judicial au-
thorization"'28-a warrant-before government
agents could surreptitiously enter to install elec-
tronic eavesdropping devices. Here, the district
court's order authorizing such entry had been too
broad and was thus found invalid. According to
the court, "[a] person whose physical privacy is to
be invaded has a right to expect the judicial officer
issuing an intercept order will authorize only those
entries and those means of entry necessary to satisfy
the demonstrated and cognizable needs of the ap-
plicant."'29 Furthermore, in view of the fact that
the Supreme Court had earlier concluded that
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the fourth amendment is
directed,"' the court suggested that physical entry
should only be sought after alternative means of
'23 It should be noted that the court was "not con-
cerned with the fact that the same document served to
authorize both the interceptions and the breaking or that
the document was not in terms denominated a 'war-
rant."' Id. at 695 n. 1.
' 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
125 The intercept order was not issued pursuant to Title
III, but to a District of Columbia statute, 23 D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 541-556 (1973). The court stated that the D.C.
statute was "very similar to and.., based on the corre-
sponding sections of Title III." 553 F.2d at 148 n.4.
" 553 F.2d at 149 n.12.
'27 Id. at 149-50.
'28Id. at 154.
'
2 9 Id. at 170.
13 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972).
interception had been attempted. 13 1 "[T]he least
intrusive means rationale implicit in Katz ... re-
quires that, where possible, such evidence should
be gathered without entering private premises and
that where entry is required the judicial authori-
zation therefore should circumscribe that entry to
the need shown."'
13
As with the decision in Application of United States
and United States v. Agrusa, the decision in United
States v. Fordlss attempted to vindicate fourth
amendment interests by specifically addressing Ti-
tle III's failure to establish guidelines and proce-
dures for implementation. By requiring prior, ex-
press judicial approval of breaking and entering
when necessary to successfully implement an inter-
cept order, these courts recognized the historical
tradition of the fourth amendment and its basic
purpose of safeguarding individual privacy and
security against arbitrary governmental intru-
sions."M Since the trespass inherent in surreptitious
entry violates one's "reasonable expectations of
privacy," the citizen should have the right to expect
that the intrusion was authorized by a neutral and
detached magistrate. This would help ensure that
a prior determination of necessity had been made.
In addition, the scope of authority must be parti-
cularized so as to avoid the abuses of the general
warrant.
Finally, the Sixth'3 5 and Ninth'33 Circuits have
taken the position that Title III does not permit
courts to authorize break-ins for the purpose of
installing listening devices. In United States v. Fin-
azzo,137 the defendants had been indicted for brib-
ery of a public official on the basis of evidence
obtained through conversations intercepted in ac-
cordance with the-requirements of Title III. How-
ever, the "bugs" had been installed through un-
authorized breaking and entering. Significantly,
the court rejected the reasoning of all the other
federal circuit courts that had held either that Title
III implicitly authorizes such entries or that such
entries must receive prior, express judicial ap-
proval. Rather, the court held
that judges do not have power under the ... wire-
tapping statute to authorize breaking and entering
131 See text accompanying notes 208-10 infra.
'2 United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 158.
133 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
'3' See text accompanying notes 19-42 supra.
'3 United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir.
1978).
136 United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.
1978).
137 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978).
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in order to install electronic devices; and in the
absence of specific statutory authority, they do not
have the power under the Fourth Amendment...
[and] that federal law enforcement agents do not
have independent statutory or constitutional au-
thority to engage in break-ins to install eavesdrop-
ping devices.... [and that] the judiciary does not
have inherent power to delegate this authority to
police officers.... '3
Strongly emphasizing the invasion of privacy, the
possibility of property damage, and the threat to
personal security that breaking and entering en-
tails, the court felt that
[iut simply does not make sense to imply
Congi'essional authority for official break-ins
when not a single line or word of the'statute
even mentions the possibility, much less limits
or defines the scope of the power or describes
the circumstances under which such conduct,
normally unlawful, may take place.'
39
Equating an intercept order with a search war-
rant for fourth amendment purposes,140 the Finazzo
court extensively examined the source of the power
of federal judges to issue warrants. The court scru-
tinized the English common-law precedents as well
as early American court decisions-particularly
Boyd v. United States.1' On the basis of its own
historical analysis, the court concluded that the
power of federal courts could not exceed the scope
of their creation. In other words, "courts which are
created by written law, and whose jurisidiction is
defined by written law, cannot transcend that ju-
risdiction.' 42 Thus, in the absence of explicit stat-
utory authorization, the court felt powerless to
authorize any means of surreptitious entry to im-
plement an intercept order.
In United States v. Santora," the Ninth Circuit
took a position very similar to that of the Finazzo
court. In this case, the defendants were convicted
on charges relating to stolen airline tickets and
trafficking in controlled substances. In addition to
sanctioning the use of wiretapping and "bugging,"
the district court had expressly authorized mem-
bers of the FBI to forcibly "enter... install, main-
tain, and subsequently remove"'4 such devices at
'1 Id. at 838.
'3Id. at 841.
40 Id. at 845-48.
141 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
142 United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 844 (quoting
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807)).
'4 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978).
'4 Id. at 454.
defendant's business premises. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Although
finding the introduction into evidence of incrimi-
nating conversations intercepted through wiretap-
ping to be legal, the court found eavesdropping
accomplished through the use of surreptitious entry
to be impermissible under Title III. The court
carefully analyzed the legislative history of Title
III and concluded "that the overriding concern
was the protection of privacy." 145 The court was
unwilling to interpret legislative silence on the
question of implementation as implicit authority
for physical intrusion into the privacy and sanctity
of the home, particularly, since "Congress was fully
aware that not all bugging required trespasses, let
alone break-ins. The most common form of elec-
tronic eavesdropping is 'participant electronic sur-
veillance,' in which an informant equipped with
hidden recording devices gains access to the home
or office by non-trespassory means and surrepti-
tiously records conversations.' 46 As far as this
court was concerned, more explicit statutory au-
thority was required before it would countenance
breaking and entering under Title III.
In summary, both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
took a much narrower approach to the question of
Title III's silence regarding implementation than
did the other circuits. Finazzo and Santora reflect an
unwillingness to read beyond the explicit language
of the federal statute. This position unnecessarily
constricts the efficient operation of Title III. Leg-
islative history demonstrates two purposes moti-
vating the enactment of the statute: 1) a desire to
provide a means of aiding the difficult fight against
organized crime and 2) protection of the privacy
of wire and oral communications."1 7 Finding the
protection of privacy to be of overriding impor-
tance, the Finazzo and Santora courts refused to
balance these two considerations. Rather, these
courts took the absolutist position that federal dis-
trict courts are to be strictly circumscribed in the
exercise of an otherwise traditional power-the
issuance of court orders or warrants."
"' Id. at 463.
14s Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
147 See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
" The Santora court's unwillingness to equate an elec-
tronic surveillance intercept order with a search warrant
should be recognized. The court considered the only
similarity to be the utilization of a neutral magistrate
Search warrants are not executed surreptitiously,
and they are always limited to things in being which
the officers have probable cause to believe are con-
traband .... Warrant procedure permits the person
subjecte4 to the search to have notice of the fact of
19791
2. The Supreme Court Response: Dalia v. United States
The contours of this difficult issue of interpreting
Title III's silence on the matter of implementation
were delineated for consideration by the United
States Supreme Court when it finally agreed to
confront the problem in Dalia v. United States.
49
In this case, on an application by the Justice
Department, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey found probable cause to
believe that petitioner was a member of a conspir-
acy involved in the interstate shipment of stolen
goods.I5' Further finding that there was reason to
believe that petitioner's business telephones were
being used to further the conspiracy and that
means of investigating the conspiracy other than
through electronic surveillance would be danger-
ous and unlikely to succeed, the district court
granted the government a twenty-day authoriza-
tion to intercept certain telephone conversations
taking place in petitioner's business office. Follow-
ing this initial twenty-day period, an extension was
granted. This time, however, the court order al-
lowed the government to "intercept all oral con-
versations taking place in petitioner's office, includ-
ing those not involving the telephone."' 151 As it
later developed, FBI agents covertly entered peti-
tioner's business office to install an electronic bug
in the ceiling.
Subsequently, petitioner was convicted of receiv-
ing stolen fabric. At trial, the government had
introduced several intercepted telephone conver-
the search, and it also provides him with an oppor-
tunity to move to quash the warrant, to demand
return of whatever has been seized, and otherwise
to challenge the validity of the warrant .... These
protections are either non-existent or irrelevant in
respect of court-authorized orders for electronic sur-
veillance, even absent a break-in. Unlike an arrest
warrant, or a search warrant, a court order author-
izing an electronic surveillance with or without a
break-in, is not a step in an adversary process, but
rather a step in an ongoing investigation which may
never lead to nor permit adversary challenge.
583 F.2d 462-63 n.6.
149 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979). The Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable search
and seizure is not an absolute prohibition against covert
entry under any circumstances. The Court next held that
although Title III does not explicitly authorize breaking
and entering, it gives the courts the inherent power to do
so. Finally, dividing five to four, the Court held that the
fourth amendment does not require that a Title III
intercept order include a specific authorization to co-
vertly enter the premises described in the order.
0 United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 867 (D.
N.J. 1977).
" 99 S. Ct. at 1686.
sations demonstrating petitioner's complicity in the
conspiracy. Prior to trial, petitioner had unsuccess-
fully moved to suppress evidence obtained by
means of the eavesdropping devices installed in his
office. Following trial, another motion to suppress
was denied on the basis that "implicit in the court's
order [authorizing electronic surveillance] is con-
comitant authorization for agents to covertly enter
the premises in question and install the necessary
equipment."t 52 Furthermore, the court took the
position that in this particular instance such entry
was the "safest and most successful method of
accomplishing the installation."
'53
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed petitioner's conviction 54 The court did
suggest, however, that "the more prudent or pref-
erable approach for government agents would be
to include a statement regarding the need of a
surreptitious entry in a request for the interception
of oral communications when a break-in is contem-
plated."' t 5
Initially, the Supreme Court confronted Dalia's
broad claim that the fourth amendment per se
prohibits all surreptitious entries. Petitioner's ar-
gument was that "legislative authority for law
enforcement officers to commit otherwise illegal
breakings and entries into the home or office of a
suspect is inherently unreasonable." '" 6 The Su-
preme Court quickly dismissed this argument,
"mak[ing] explicit ... what ha[d] long been im-
plicit in [its] decisions dealing with this subject:
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a
covert entry performed for the purpose of installing
otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.""57
Having decided that covert entries are not per
se violative of the fourth amendment, the Dalia
Court was prepared to meet petitioner's next con-
tention: "that Congress has not given the courts
statutory authority to approve covert entries for
the purpose of installing electronic surveillance
equipment. ' 158 Basically, petitioner emphasized
the general comprehensive nature of Title III and
noted that "[n]owhere in Title III may there be
found authorization for a court to permit an other-
wise illegal breaking and entering."'9 Citing the
52 426 F. Supp. 862, 866 (D.N.J. 1977).
53id.
'54 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978); see text accompanying
notes 101-02 supra.
'55 575 F.2d at 1346-47.
's6 Brief for Petitioner at 20, Dalia v. United States, 99
S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
15799 S. Ct. at 1689.
15sId.
',9 Brief for Petitioner at 17.
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availability of alternative methods of accomplish-
ing an electronic eavesdrop, petitioner argued that
"it does not follow as a matter of logical necessity
that the Legislature's permission to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance also implies its permission to
commit breakings and entries." ' 6 Finally, accord-
ing to petitioner, "[t]he far more likely explanation
for the absence of any explicit authorization in
Title III is that there was no consensus to permit
breakings and entries."'
161
The Supreme Court, however, was not per-
suaded. Rather, refusing to eviscerate the law en-
forcement purpose behind the statute, the Court
found that "the language, structure, and history of
the statute ... demonstrate that Congress meant
to authorize courts ... to approve electronic sur-
veillance without limitation on the means neces-
sary to its accomplishment, so long as they are
reasonable under the circumstances."' t 2 Adopting
a policy approach, the Court was more than willing
to construe statutory silence and legislative ambi-
guity to support limited breaking and entering. By
assuming that Congress was "aware that most
bugging requires covert entry," the Supreme Court
felt compelled to conclude that "[t]hose considering
the surveillance legislation understood that, by
authorizing electronic interception of oral com-
munications in addition to wire communications,
they were necessarily authorizing surreptitious en-
tries."'
163
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court seems to
have reached this conclusion by interpreting
the congressional debates as demonstrating that
"[mlembers of Congress simply saw no distinction
between electronic surveillance which required
covert entry and that which required covert tap-
ping of one's telephone [since] [tihe invasion or the
privacy of conversations is the same in both situa-
tions." 164 At the threshold, this is a difficult prop-
osition to sustain in the light of ambiguous congres-
sional debates.
The utter absence of any legislative history that can
be pointed to indicating a conscious decision to
permit surreptitious entries is powerful evidence that
Congress did not intend to confer such authority
upon law enforcement officers or the courts. Cer-
tainly an issue with such enormous public interest
and political consequences would have been the
160 Brief for Petitioner at 18.
161 Id.
'6 99 S. Ct. at 1689.
'6 Id. at 1691.
164Id. at 1690 n. 12.
subject of specific debate had it been the intent to
confer such authority through Title lII.V '
Furthermore, in light of the other substantial
fourth amendment interests at stake, such as the
protection of the possibility of physical destruction
of property occurring in the course of a forcible
entry, more explicit congressional authority for
such entries should have been required.
Finally, even assuming congressional authoriza-
tion for surreptitious entry under Title III, the
question of whether the fourth amendment re-
quired express judicial approval of such entry still
remained. As indicated above, this is the issue
which had split the circuits. Petitioner, relying on
United States v. Ford'6 and Application of the United
States,'67 had maintained that "a warrant must be
particular and specific if it is to stand constitutional
attack."'" Given the significance of the constitu-
tional rights involved, rather than allowing law
enforcement officials to carry out a Title III inter-
cept order by whatever means desired, petitioner
argued that approval by a neutral and detached
magistrate be interposed.
In response, the Supreme Court took the position
that petitioner's "view of the warrant clause parses
too finely the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment."' 6 Applying a three-pronged analy-
sis, the Court found that the fourth amendment
only required that search warrants describe with
particularity the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized and that -a judge
authorizing the issuance of a warrant have proba-
ble cause to believe that "'the evidence sought will
aid in a particular apprehension or conviction' for
a partiiuiar offense. ' '17 Satisfied that the court
order authorizing the interception in this case had
been issued in full compliance with these tradi-
tional fourth amendment requirements, the Court
was unwilling to require express judicial authori-
zation for surreptitious entry. "It would extend the
warrant clause to the extreme to require that,
whenever it is reasonably likely that Fourth
Amendment rights may be affected in more than
one way, the Court must set forth precisely the
procedures to be followed by the executing offi-
cers.'
17 1
i's Brief for Petitioner at 18-19.
'6 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
167 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970).
168 Brief for Petitioner at 25.1 99 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
170 Id. at 1692 (citation omitted).
7 Id at 1694.
19791
In approaching the Dalia decision, it is helpful
to keep in mind that although the Supreme Court
has recently stated that "physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed,', 172 the fourth
amendment, by its terms, is not absolute. The
Framers established the warrant procedure to de-
termine when the privacy of the home must give
way to legitimate interests of law enforcement.
Nonetheless, once issued, warrants are not self-ex-
ecuting. Under English common law, an officer
could not break into a home to execute service
unless he first stated his purpose and requested
admittance t7 3 This requirement of prior notice of
authority and purpose as a condition precedent to
forcible entry was later adopted by early American
courts.
17 4
The common law requirements have been codi-
fied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109,175 which forbids forcible
entry into a home to execute a search warrant
unless, after giving notice of his authority and
purpose, an officer is refused admittance or is in
need of liberation. Since this is the only federal
statute dealing with forcible entry into the home,
several of the circuits176 dealing with implementa-
tion under Title III had sought guidance from its
language and prior applications. Yet, as the Eighth
Circuit recognized in United States v. Agrusa, "Sec-
tion 3109 is not a statute to be woodenly applied
without regard to the particular circumstances at
hand, it is instead.., subject to such exceptions as
were ... recognized"' 77 at common law.
At least three separate purposes are fulfilled by
meeting the specific requirements of section 3109.
For one thing, it decreases the potential for violence
to both officers and the occupants of the house in
which the entry is sought. It safeguards "officers,
who might be mistaken, upon an unannounced
intrusion into a home, for someone with no right
to be there."' 7" Secondly, the "knock and notice"
requirement reflects "the reverence of the law for
'72 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972).
'73See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.
1603).
'74 See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,313 (1958)
(discussing early American law).
'75 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976). This statute is reprinted
at note 114 supra.
176 See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
'" 541 F.2d at 699.
'78 Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968).
the individual's right of privacy in his house"' 79
and helps prevent the embarrassment that the
unexpected exposure of private activities of the
occupants of a home might entail.'8 Finally, this
statute guards against the needless destruction of
private property.18' Such destruction may be the
inevitable result of a forcible entry.
Given the significant nature of these interests,
the procedure outlined in section 3109 has been
held to apply to arrests on probable cause without
warrantst 8 and to arrests with warrants.It 3 How-
ever, the requirements of section 3109 are com-
pletely incompatible with any form of electronic
surveillance. Since the effectiveness of eavesdrop-
ping depends upon the suspect's lack of notice,
t8
fulfilling the explicit mandates of the statute would
be self-defeating. In Dalia, this position was reaf-
firmed. Finding petitioner's argument for notice to
be "frivolous," the Court cited Katz for the propo-
sition that "officers need not announce their pur-
pose before conducting an otherwise [duly] author-
ized search if such an announcement would pro-
voke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of
critical evidence."' tss In other words, an alternative
to the notice requirement under the fourth amend-
ment might be a showing of exigent circumstances.
According to Berger, "[s]uch a showing of exigency,
in order to avoid notice would appear more im-
portant in eavesdropping, with its inherent dan-
gers, than that required when conventional proce-
dures of search and seizure are utilized."'s
It should be noted that over the years courts
have carved out a number of exceptions to the
requirements of section 3109. For instance, the
Supreme Court stated in Miller v. United States
t18
7
that a failure to give an express announcement of
purpose could be excused if "the facts known to
officers could justify them in being virtually certain
that the [occupant] already knows their purpose so
that announcement would be a useless gesture. 
' t88
'79 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
" Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975).
'8' United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th
Cir. 1974).
18'See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
" See id. See also Vanella v. United States, 371 F.2d 50
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967).
18'4 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' 99 S. Ct. at 1688 (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 355 n.18 (1967)).
"6 388 U.S. at 60.
187 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
'88 Id. at 310. See also United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d
109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1974).
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In Sabbath v. United States,19 the Supreme Court
cited with approval three exceptions' 90 to the an-
nouncement requirement that Justice Brennan had
earlier noted in his dissent in Ker v. California."9 In
that case, police officers gained entry to an apart-
ment by the use of a passkey and conducted a
search incident to an arrest. Narcotics which were
seized in the course of this search were introduced
at trial. Upholding the validity of the arrests, the
plurality opinion '9 recognized that exigent cir-
cumstances excuse compliance with the notice re-
quirement of section 844 of the California Penal
Code. ,93 The decision seemed to focus on the fact
that the evidence would have been "quickly and
easily destroyed" and that petitioner "might well
have been expecting the police."' In his dissent,
Mr. Justice Brennan set forth three exceptions to
the announcement requirement:
1) where the persons within already know of the
officer's authority and purpose, or 2) where the
officers are justified in the belief that persons within
are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or 3) where
those within made aware of the presence of someone
outside ... are then engaged in activity which jus-
tifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.9
In addition, the requirements have been waived
where an announcement would create "palpable
peril to the life or limb of the arresting officers.'
'
As with the explicit language of section 3109, it
1'9391 U.S. 585 (1968).
190 Id. at 591 n.8. Note that § 844 of the California
Penal Code rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) was
applicable. This state statute which permits police officers
to break into dwellings for the purpose of arrest after
demanding admittance and explaining their purpose is
essentially analogous to the federal statute. See note 193
infrea
'91 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 Mr. Justice Harlan, unwilling to apply the fourth
amendment directly to the states, voted to affirm convic-
tion on the basis of the "fundamental fairness" standard
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
3 This siatute reads:
To make an arrest ... a peace officer, may break
open the door or window of the house in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which they have
reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after
having demanded admittance and explained the
purpose for which admittance is desired.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1956).
194 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 40.
195 Id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'96 United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971) (quoting Gilbert v.
United States, 366 F.2d 923, 932 (1966)).
would appear that the above exceptions are in-
applicable to the situation of breaking and entering
to install electronic eavesdropping equipment. At
least this seems to have been the position of the
Finazzo court. "The doctrine of 'exigent circum-
stances' ... has no application to an entry for the
purpose of installing an eavesdrop device, an entry
planned in advance to take place when a home or
office is unattended and the regular occupants are
unaware of the officer's presence.
' '3 s9
Nonetheless, in a cursory manner, the Dalia
Court took a different view of the matter. As in
Agnrsa,198 the self-defeating nature of an announce-
ment was considered to be an exigent circumstance
justifying the failure to give notice. Perhaps the
fact that entry took place at unoccupied business
premises and not at home weighed in favor of the
Court's interpretation of the exigency exception.
Despite their facial dissimilarity, it is interesting
to note the underlying parallelism of the Supreme
Court's Dalia decision and the position of the Fin-
azzo Court. At the heart of each decision lies the
recognition that the announcement requirement of
section 3109 is inapplicable to the area of electronic
surveillance. The disagreement centers on the ap-
plicability of the "exigency" exceptions and partic-
ularly the "destruction of evidence" analogy. For
the Finazzo court, the exceptions are inapposite.
The implementation of an intercept order, an op-
eration planned in advance and usually executed
intentionally when the premises are vacant, does
not fit the framework of "exigent circumstances."
Moreover, the court felt the "threatened destruc-
tion of evidence" circumstance was only an issue
when "the person inside is aware of the presence
and purpose of the officer."' 99 On the other hand,
the Dalia decision seemed to find the "destruction
of evidence" analogy to be the very epitome of an
exigent circumstance.
Given the intrusive nature of breaking and en-
tering and the fact that implementation of an
intercept order will ordinarily occur when the
premises are vacant, the position taken by the Sixth
Circuit in Finazzo seems preferable to that of the
United States Supreme Court. Recognizing the
privacy and sanctity of the home, as well as the
other constitutional interests previously discussed,
section 3109 attempts to establish safeguards to
prevent secret, forcible entries into private prem-
ises. If the announcement of one's identity and
17 United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 846.
98 See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
99 583 F.2d at 846.
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purpose can be avoided because such information
would lead occupants to avoid incriminating state-
ments to begin with, this "destruction of evidence"
exception could swallow the rule. Since an an-
nouncement would certainly lead to the avoidance
of incriminating conversations within a home sub-
ject to judicially authorized electronic surveillance,
the result is that announcements would never be
necessary. The point is that there are limits to the
extent that even the Supreme Court should stretch
the exception of "exigent circumstances." It would
seem that such a limit is reached in the area of
electronic eavesdropping. Consequently, the better
position simply would have been to find the statute
and its exceptions inapplicable to the implemen-
tation of an intercept order. Physical intrusions
into the sanctity of the home then would be tested
generally by the reasonableness standard of the
fourth amendment and particularly by the express
approval of the judge issuing the intercept order
rather than by recourse to judicially created excep-
tions to section 3109.
According to Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Dalia, "breaking and entering into private premises
for the purpose of planting a bug cannot be char-
acterized as a mere mode of warrant execution to
be left to the discretion of the executing officer."
2W
Both this dissent and that of Justice Stevens rec-
ognized the grave fourth amendment risks the
majority's position entailed: "[I1t is tantamount to
an independent search and seizure." 2 1 As far as
the dissenters were concerned, although "the war-
rant could, consistent with the command of the
Fourth Amendment, leave the details of how best
to proceed with the covert entry to the discretion
of the executing officers," 2 2 the initial authoriza-
tion for breaking and entering must originate with
a judicial officer.
By following the approach of the dissent, a num-
ber of serious deficiencies in the position of the
majority would be avoided. To begin with, express
judicial approval more closely comports with the
literal language of the fourth amendment. The
inclusion of an express provision in the warrant
better serves the requirements of the particularity
clause. Specifically, "it will fulfill the particularity
clause function of clearly informing the officer
whether or not the entry has been approved." In
the words of one commentator,
m 99 S. Ct. at 1694-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 1695.
202id.
m Note, Covert Entry In Electronic Surveillance: The Fourth
Amendment Requirements, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 203, 219
(1978).
In the same way that express authorization of the
target premises and the conversations to be seized
minimizes possible official misunderstanding as to
the justifiable scope of surveillance, express author-
ization,.of covert entry protects the individual from
an unjustifiable entry. To deny the individual this
added margin of protection is to interpret the par-
ticularity clause too narrowly in the light of both the
breadth with which fourth amendment language
has been usually interpreted and the need to keep
the particularity clause abreast of therecent changes
in the probable cause standard.2' 4
In light of the historical emphasis upon minim-
ization of official intrusiveness into individual pri-
vacy, the position of the majority is difficult to
understand. As noted earlier, the framing of the
fourth amendment was influenced by the early
American experience with general warrants and
writs of assistance. To interpret any intercept order
as authorizing breaking and entering by implica-
tion is to undermine a very. substantial constitu-
tional right. To do so on the basis of unclear
legislative guidance is to invite abuse of our pre-
cious right of privacy.
The approach taken by the majority also is
inconsistent with the overall emphasis of Title III-
an emphasis upon minimizing the intrusiveness of
an intercept order. According to sections 2518(1) (c)
and 2518(3)(c), electronic surveillance is "not to be
routinely employed as the initial step in a criminal
investigation." Additionally, such methods are not
to be "resorted to in situations where traditional
investigative techniques would suffice to expose the
crime."'  As such, the application must contain a
complete statement as to why normal investigative
procedures are not being used. Such techniques
apparently are to be employed unless they have
been tried and have failed or else "reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous."2' This language clearly demon-
strates that it was the desire of Congress in passing
Title III to minimize the intrusiveness of electronic
surveillance. Consequently, a more consistent ap-
proach for the Supreme Court to have taken would
have been to have required initial consideration of
alternative methods of accomplishing the intercep-
tion of oral communications occurring within the
home or upon business premises. Given the possible
usefulness of a parabolic microphone, for example,




" United States v. Kahn, 415 US. 143, 153 n.12
(1974).
2o6 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c), (3)(c) (1976).
[Vol. 70
TITLE III INTERCEPT ORDERS
In addition, there is a possible safety factor to
consider. In the event that law enforcement officials
mistakenly attempt to enter an occupied home or
business, there is at least the possibility that an
injury may result as the home owner attempts to
protect his premises against a forcible intrusion.
By construing the statutory language-or the
absence thereof-so as to require that breaking and
entering be employed only when alternative means
have been tried and have failed or else reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, the Su-
preme Court would merely have been extending
the express requirements of sections 2518(l) (c) and
2518(3)(c). Moreover, such a position would have
substantially minimized the potential for abuse,
the threat to personal security, and the invasion of
personal privacy offered by the fourth amendment.
Only when efforts to minimize the intrusion have
proven unacceptable would breaking and entering
to plant listening devices be authorized. While
"Itihe additional burden on the government of
providing prior justification for a covert entry does
not appear significant, ' 'as 7 the additional protec-
tion it offers may very likely be appreciable. By
interposing the neutral and detached magistrate
between the citizen's rights and the demands of
law enforcement officials, the fourth amendment
requires that a balance must be struck in each case.
To interpret an intercept order as automatically
implicitly countenancing surreptitious entry at the
discretion of those involved in the daily pursuit of
illegal activities is to abandon this carefully crafted
balance.
V. THE RELEVANCE OF THE "PLAIN VIEW"
DOCTRINE
Given the fact that surreptitious entry to install
electronic eavesdropping devices will often expose
personal papers and effects to officers participating
in the operation, it is necessary to examine the
contours of the "plain view" doctrine-an exami-
nation absent in the majority's opinion in Dalia.
Ordinarily, a search warrant must describe with
particularity the goods that are to be seized. The
general rule is that the officers conducting a search
may seize only the property described in the war-
rant. However, under certain circumstances, it is
settled law that certain items not named in the
search warrant may be seized if discovered in the
course of a lawful search. According to Mr. Justice
Stewart in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,2w
' Note, Covert Entry In Electronic Surveillance: The Fourth
Amendment Requirements, supra note 203, at 214.
m 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
[ijn the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by
the police will be in plain view, at least at the
moment of seizure. The problem with the 'plain
view' doctrine has been to identify the circumstances
in which plain view has legal significance rather
than being simply the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal.2a
Justice Stewart's opinion -2 10 stated that there are
two prerequisites to the availability of the "plain
view" doctrine. First, the police officer must have
prior fourth amendment justification for his intru-
sion as "plain view alone is never enough to justify
the warrantless seizure of evidence., 21 1 In other
words, the law enforcement official must have "a




Importantly, the prior justification for the initial
intrusion need not be a warrant. Any one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
will suffice, i.e., hot pursuit or limited search inci-
dent to an arrest. 3 Second, the discovery of such
evidence must have been inadvertent. 21 4 For, "[i]f
the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant
that fails to mention a particular object, though
the police know its location and intend to seize it,
then there is a violation of the express constitu-
tional requirement of 'Warrants ... particularly
describing... [t]he things to be seized. 21 5 Finally,
it should be noted that no object in plain view can
be seized, even though these two prerequisites have
been met, unless there is probable cause to believe
that the item is contraband or constitutes evidence
of an offense. The evidence seized must be of a
character by which "it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them.
2 1 6
As a result of the existence of the "plain view"
doctrine, additional consequences attach to surrep-
titious entry. Under the Supreme Court's ap-
proach, reading the intercept order itself as implicit
authorization for such entry, the first prerequisite
ofJustice Stewart's Coolidge analysis is met. For the
presence of the police officers would then be justi-
fied. Certain problems arise, however, in regard to
the second element of the Coolidge test. Given the
fact that an intercept order is directed solely at
o Id. at 465 (emphasis in original).
21°Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall in parts II-A, I1-B, and II-C only.
However, these sections included the discussion of the
"plain view" doctrine.
211 403 U.S. at 468 (emphasis in original).
2'2 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
23 403 U.S. at 463 n.20.
214 Id. at 469-71.
• 
5
' Id. at 47 1.
"*
1 Id. at 466.
wire or oral communications, the express terms of
such an order ordinarily anticipate only the seizure
of intangible evidence. In other words, there will
be no particularized language directed at the
search and/or seizure of tangible evidence-for no
such activity will be anticipated. Nonetheless, in
the course of installing eavesdropping equipment,
particularly in the search for suitably discreet
places to conceal "bugs," law enforcement officials
may very likely inadvertently discover incriminat-
ing evidence related, or even unrelated, to the
criminal activities being investigated. If the police
anticipate discovering such evidence, they most
likely would proceed through the ordinary search
warrant procedure thus avoiding the additional
procedural requirements of Title III. Thus, as a
consequence of applying the Stewart prerequisites,
law enforcement officials may be allowed to partic-
ipate in "fishing expeditions" in the course of
implementing a Title III intercept order. The in-
tercept order thus becomes a pretext to search for
tangible evidence for which there is insufficient
evidence to satisfy the threshold probable cause
requirement for the issuance of the ordinary search
warrant. Unfortunately, the majority failed to rec-
ognize this possibility.
It would seem clear that the rationale underlying
the inadvertency requirement 2 17 is completely in-
consistent with the execution of intercept orders
directed at the seizure of intangible evidence. To
limit the possibility of extending the intercept order
into a general writ as a result of its interaction with
the "plain view" doctrine, the preferable position
is to require prior express judicial approval of the
breaking and entering. Interposing a neutral and
detached magistrate between the government and
the people serves to reduce the likelihood of artifice
by overzealous police.
In terms of the "plain view" doctrine, express
judicial authorization for covert entry satisfies the
first Coolidge prerequisite in ensuring that the offi-
cers have a right to be in the position from which
incriminating evidence can be inadvertently spot-
ted. Moreover, if, as suggested, a judge is required
to consider alternative means of accomplishing the
interception of oral communications in order to
217 Where once an otherwise lawful search is in
progress, the police inadvertently come upon a piece
of evidence, it would often be a needless inconven-
ience, and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence
or the police themselves-to require them to ignore
it until they have obtained a warrant particularly
describing it.
Id. at 467-68.
satisfy the least intrusive means rationale implicit
in Katz and explicit in Title III, the potential for
abuses of the inadvertency requirement may be
severely limited. For, to the extent alternative
means are available, private premises will not be
entered surreptitiously-at least as a first resort.
The possibility of circumventing the probable
cause requirement of a search warrant through the
concomittant use of an intercept order as a license
to engage in searches for tangible evidence would
be rendered less likely.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the point of departure for any
consideration of covert physical entry into a citi-
zen's home must be the fourth amendment and
particularly the abuses inherent in the general
warrant system that gave rise to the amendment.
Historical experience teaches that law enforcement
officials must not be allowed free rein. As a conse-
quence, the concept of a neutral and detached
intermediary balancing of the government's legiti-
mate law enforcement interests against the citizen's
right of privacy and security has been the operative
safeguard embodied in the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement. Importantly, warrants substitute
the judgment of a magistrate for the judgment of
a police officer.
The adoption of Title III, following the decisions
in Berger and Katz, added a substantial weapon to
the arsenals of law enforcement officials in their
fight against criminal activities. Nonetheless, it is
a weapon that lends itself to abuse if not carefully
administered. As enacted, Title III establishes a
very detailed procedural system that conforms to
the suggested minimal fourth amendment require-
ments of the Supreme Court's decisions in the
above cases. For the most part, close scrutiny by a
judicial officer during all phases of the actual
intercept serves to enhance the protection of indi-
vidual rights within the context of an otherwise
extremely intrusive law enforcement activity. Yet,
despite an overall emphasis upon minimization of
the intrusion, the statute remains silent on the
manner of implementing an eavesdrop. With the
decision in Dalia, law enforcement officials are free
to assume that all intercept orders implicitly au-
thorize breaking and entering.
Although it would have been desirable, primar-
ily in terms of limitations of scope, for Title III to
have included language establishing uniform, gen-
eral guidelines for the implementation of orders
authorizing electronic eavesdropping, it would
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seem that the better position for the Supreme Court
to have taken would have been to follow the ap-
proach of the Fourth, Eighth, and District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Courts of Appeals. That position
implies the authority ofjudicial officers to balance
competing interests and to issue particularized ap-
proval of breaking and entering, when necessary,
but does not automatically imply such approval.
In essence, while the surveillance itself may be
legally authorized by an intercept order under
Title III, this view holds that the legality of covert
entry is entitled to separate fourth amendment
scrutiny. This is a more flexible approach and
makes more sense in light of the fact that such
entry is very often a condition precedent to the
execution of an eavesdrop. Moreover, in terms of
constitutional safeguards, allowing express judicial
authorization serves to vindicate the interests of
privacy, personal security, and protection of prop-
erty implicit in the fourth amendment. Basically,
the requisite specificity of such an order serves to
reduce the opportunity for abuse in the operation
of police discretion.
Finally, judicial evaluation of the need for entry
seems consistent with the language of 18 U.S.C.
§2518(l)(c), (3)(c). These two provisions require
the submission and judicial consideration of a
"statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried
or to be too dangerous." Although resort to elec-
tronic surveillance need. not be a measure of last
recourse, it is "not to be routinely employed as the
initial step in a criminal investigation." 218 The
emphasis is thus upon the least intrusive means of
accomplishing the investigative end. Thus, as a
matter of logical consistency, the Supreme Court
might better have taken the position that ajudicial
officer should be required to consider the need for
allowing breaking and entering. In other words,
have less intrusive means of implementing an in-
218 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515
(1974).
tercept order authorizing eavesdropping been tried
and failed? Or, do such means appear to be un-
likely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to
attempt?
Modern technology offers police a number of
devices which may overhear and record conversa-
tions transpiring within the most private confines
without necessitating a physical entry.219 These
include parabolic microphones, detectaphones,
and devices "which [make] use of the vibrations in
a window pane as it responds to sound from
within."220 in addition, "portable laser 'mikes' emit
an invisible infrared beam no larger than a pencil
which may enter the home or office through a
closed window. The beam is then reflected back
and the conversation decoded." 221 Moreover, there
may be a number of other devices available equally
capable of intercepting conversations occurring
within enclosed areas without recourse to breaking
and entering to install "bugs." The point is that
there are alternative means of implementing an
intercept order authorizing electronic eavesdrop-
ping. The language of sections 2518(1)(c) and
2518(3) (c) strongly suggests that these alternatives
be considered before surreptitious entry is author-
ized. The burden then would be upon law enforce-
ment officials to justify a request for permission to
break and enter by showing the ineffectiveness or
likelihood of failure of these alternative methods.
Given the substantial nature of the constitutional
interests implicated by forcible entry, this burden
does not seem unreasonable.
Jerry M. Peven
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